There are two different ways of defining complexity.1) Traditionally, the word "complexity" is considered synonymous to "organization". The transformation of species is an expression of victory against random indifferencism.

"Aujourd'hui, notre pitié ne s'arrête plus à l'humanité. Elle continue sur sa lancée. Elle repousse les frontières. Elle élargit le cercle du semblable. Quand un coin du voile est levé sur l'invivable existence des poules, des vaches ou des cochons dans les espaces concentrationnaires qui ont succédé aux fermes d'autrefois, l'imagination se met aussitôt à la place de ces bêtes et souffre avec elles. L'homme moderne est tiraillé entre une ambition immense et une compassion sans limite. Il veut être le (...) Seigneur de la Création et il découvre progressivement en lui la faculté de s'identifier à toutes les créatures. Ainsi s'explique l'irruption récente de la cause animale sur la scène politique. La nouvelle sensibilité aux animaux aura-t-elle le pouvoir de changer la donne ou l'impératif de rentabilité continuera- t-il à faire la loi, en dépit de tous les cris du coeur?" A. F. (shrink)

Selon K. Perszyk, la description meinongienne des objets apatrides est une nouveauté : elle ne se rattache à aucune théorie ontologique antérieure, qu'elle soit avicennienne ou scolastique. On discute ici cette thèse en s'attachant à deux notions fondamentales de l'ontologie antique et médiévale : la subsistance et l'existence, qui semblent présenter certaines affinités avec les notions meinongiennes de bestehen. Sosein vs. Sein et existieren. On examine sous cet angle la théorie des objets généraux, des entités fictives et des particuliers non-existants (...) chez Porphyre, Proclus, Abélard, Thomas d'Aquin, Roger Bacon. According to Perszyk, Meinong's description of homeless objects is a novelty: it does not trace back to any traditional ontological assumption, neither avicennian nor scolastic. While discussing this claim, one focuses on two key-notions in ancient and medieval ontology: subsistence and existence, which seem to be akin to the meinongian bestehen, Sosein vs. Sein and existieren. In this respect, one comments on Porphyry's, Proclus', Abaelard's, Aquinas' and Bacon's theory of general objects, fictitious entities and non-existing particulars. (shrink)

The German philosophical culture of the Middle Ages is inextricable linked to the thought of Albert the Great. This volume brings together 14 papers, which deal with Albert's influence from the points of view of mysticism, philosophy, and the history of universities.

"To think with Nietzsche against Nietzsche." Thus the editors describe the strategy adopted in this volume to soften the destructive effects of Nietzsche's "philosophy with a hammer" on French philosophy since the 1960s. Frustrated by the infinite inclusiveness of deconstructionism, the contributors to this volume seek to renew the Enlightenment quest for rationality. Though linked by no common dogma, these essays all argue that the "French Nietzsche" transmitted through the deconstructionists must be reexamined in light of the original context in (...) which Nietzsche worked. Each essay questions the viability of Nietzsche's thought in the modern world, variously critiquing his philosophy of history as obsessed with hierarchy, his views on religion and art as myopic and irrational, and his stance on science as hopelessly reactionary. Contending that we must abandon the Nietzsche propped up as patron saint by French deconstructionists in order to return to reason, these essays will stimulate debate not just among Nietzscheans but among all with a stake in modern French philosophy. Contributors are Alain Boyer, André Compte-Sponville, Vincent Descombes, Luc Ferry, Robert Legros, Philippe Raynaud, Alain Renault, and Pierre-André Taguieff. (shrink)

Studies in the behavioral ethics and moral psychology traditions have begun to reveal the important roles of self-related processes that underlie moral behavior. Unfortunately, this research has resulted in two distinct and opposing streams of findings that are usually referred to as moral consistency and moral compensation. Moral consistency research shows that a salient self-concept as a moral person promotes moral behavior. Conversely, moral compensation research reveals that a salient self-concept as an immoral person promotes moral behavior. This study’s aim (...) was to integrate these two literatures. We argued that compensation forms a reactive, “damage control” response in social situations, whereas consistency derives from a more proactive approach to reputation building and maintenance. Two experiments supported this prediction in showing that cognitive depletion (i.e., resulting in a reactive approach) results in moral compensation whereas consistency results when cognitive resources are available (i.e., resulting in a proactive approach). Experiment 2 revealed that these processes originate from reputational (rather than moral) considerations by showing that they emerge only under conditions of accountability. It can thus be concluded that reputational concerns are important for both moral compensation and moral consistency processes, and that which of these two prevails depends on the perspective that people take: a reactive or a proactive approach. (shrink)

In the present article, we argue that the constant pressure that leaders face may limit the willpower required to behave according to ethical norms and standards and may therefore lead to unethical behavior. Drawing upon the ego depletion and moral self-regulation literatures, we examined whether self-regulatory depletion that is contingent upon the moral identity of leaders may promote unethical leadership behavior. A laboratory experiment and a multisource field study revealed that regulatory resource depletion promotes unethical leader behaviors among leaders who (...) are low in moral identity. No such effect was found among leaders with a high moral identity. This study extends our knowledge on why organizational leaders do not always conform to organizational goals. Specifically, we argue that the hectic and fragmented workdays of leaders may increase the likelihood that they violate ethical norms. This highlights the necessity to carefully schedule tasks that may have ethical implications. Similarly, organizations should be aware that overloading their managers with work may increase the likelihood of their leaders transgressing ethical norms. (shrink)

Peut-on prouver que l’âme raisonnable est par elle-même et essentiellement forme du corps? C’est pour résoudre cette question que des générations de lecteurs d’Averroès recourent à la distinction entre forme inhérente et forme assistante. On examine l’histoire de cette distinction dans l’après-coup du concile de Vienne (1312) et du concile de Latran V (1513), dans sa triple dimension noétique, ontologique et anthropologique. On présente les sources et les divers aspects de la théorie averroïste de la forme assistante, de Siger de (...) Brabant à la scolastique tardive et à la première modernité, selon laquelle l’intellect n’est ni forme inhérente ni moteur séparé, mais forme séparée. (shrink)

ExcerptDemocracy of opinion? Television democracy? Market democracy? Whether one studies them in the context of the crisis or evaluates them in relation to the dynamic of postmodernism, the pathologies affecting contemporary democracies are attracting more and more attention. The general opinion is that these pathologies, far from being inherent to democracy itself, are the result of a corruption of its principles. The most superficial observers attribute this corruption to external factors or phenomena (hence the ritualistic denunciations of fundamentalism, populism, communitarianism, (...) globalization, etc.), which amounts to questioning solely the changes in morals and the transformation of society. Yet this confuses…. (shrink)

This article offers a tentative deconstruction of Heidegger’s account of the “modern,” that is, the “Cartesian,” “subject.” It argues that subjectivity, understood as the idea of some “thing” that is both the owner of certain mental states and the agent of certain activities, is a medieval theological construct, based on two conflicting models of the mind (nous, mens) inherited from ancient philosophy and theology: the Aristotelian and the Augustinian (or perichoretic) one, developed in connection with such problems as that of (...) the two wills in the incarnate Christ. Starting with Nietzsche’s criticism of the “superstition of logicians” (the belief that“the subject I is the condition of the predicate think”) and Peter Strawson’s question in Individuals (“Why are one’s states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?”), the article discusses Peter Olivi’s and Thomas Aquinas’s treatments of the problem, as well as the principle invoked to resolve it: actiones sunt suppositorum, “actions belong to subjects.” Against this background, the discussion refers to Heidegger’s notion of “subjecticity” and Armstrong’s “attribute-theory” in order to reappraise the Hobbesian and Leibnizian contributions to the history of the Self. (shrink)

Édition du troisième sophisma « Omnis homo de necessitate est animal » du ms. Paris, BnF Lat. 16135. Le texte anonyme, contenu aux f. 99rb-103vb, appartient à la seconde collection de sophismata transmis dans ce codex légué à l’Université de Paris par Étienne de Genève socius du Collège de Sorbonne, après avoir été maître ès arts à Paris dans les années 1270. Il offre un panorama des principales positions soutenues au xiiie siècle par les Antiqui et les Moderni sur la (...) sémantique des termes vides, la distinction entre l’esse essentiae et l’esse existentiae, l’être effectif et l’être logique, le temps et la modalité. (shrink)

Brentano’s relationship to Alexander Bain has so far received little attention. The first part of this paper argues that the basic tenets of the so-called Intentionality thesis should be considered as systematically opposed to a complex of principles borrowed by Brentano from two major works by the scottish philosopher and psychologist: The Senses and the Intellect and the ‘Compendium’ on Mental and Moral Science. Bain’s doctrine is based on two sets of claims: T1 There is only a negative definition of (...) Mind: a definition “by contrast” as the “unextended”; There is a small number of general properties, whose divison under “three heads” is all that can be offered as a positive definition of Mind; those heads are Feeling, Volition, Thought or Cognition. T2 There is no one fact or property that embraces all the three; the three classes of mental phenomena do not imply each other. Brentano’s reply is based on the very opposite claims: *T1 there are several negative definitions of mind, all questionable, but there is a positive definition of Mind, that is well-grounded and not subjected to further criticisms; the division of mental phenomena must be restated on this new positive basis; the new “heads”of the new division are: Presentation, Judgement and Feeling. *T2 there is one common property that does characterize every mental phenomenon : Intentional In-existence; the phenomena of the three fundamental classes are most intimately “intertwined”; “there is no mental act in which all three are not present”. The second part of the paper discusses at length Brentano’s criticism of Bain’s theory of volition as a feeling-prompted activity. (shrink)

L’A. retrace l’histoire des propriétés individuelles de l’Antiquité et du Moyen Âge à la lumière de la théorie des tropes de D.C. Williams et Campbell. Il insiste sur l’importance de la relation de co-présence et la compare avec des notions apparentées (comme le « syndrome des qualités » ou le « rassemblement des qualités »). L’A. examine également la validité des principes du particularisme ontologique pour la philosophie d’Abélard. Il s’attache à l’examen de la thèse de la non-transférabilité des tropes, (...) chez Boèce, Abélard, et il en rappelle les origines dans l’Islam classique (théologie ash’arite). L’A. insiste sur le fait, en conclusion, que ce particularisme ontologique n’a pas forcément partie liée avec le nominalisme. (shrink)

L’interprétation d’Augustin à partir des Confessions par J.-L. Marion est une topologie de la charité (c’est-à-dire aussi une topique ou logique de l’amour), qui propose à la fois une théologie de l’adonné et une phénoménologie de la grâce. On en présente les principales thèses et quelques concepts fondamentaux en montrant et défendant l’arrière-plan théologique de la troisième voie explorée avec Augustin entre ego transcendantal et moi empirique : celle, précisément, de l’adonné, incompatible avec toute notion de sujet au sens aristotélicien (...) du terme. La lecture d’Augustin par Marion est enracinée dans la lecture augustinienne des Psaumes. Elle ne fait intervenir ni Es gibt heideggérien ni Es denkt anticartésien. Elle est aussi non gilsonienne. Comme telle elle échappe à l’horizon de la métaphysique, qu’il s’agisse de la métaphysique de l’Exode ou de la métaphysique de la conversion, en plaidant pour une lecture apophatique de l’Idipsum (« Lui-même ») comme principal Nom divin. (shrink)

Résumé L’article est consacré à l’histoire des chaires de philosophie du Collège entre 1921 et 1951, considérée à partir du double échec subi en 1941 par le médiéviste Etienne Gilson, au moment de repourvoir la chaire de « Philosophie » définie pour Édouard Le Roy en 1921 après le départ de Henri Bergson. Sur la base d’un arbre généalogique de la philosophie au Collège de France depuis 1542, l’article restitue les enjeux des deux phases du duel entre Gilson et son (...) principal opposant Mario Roques : a) le maintien de l’intitulé de Édouard Le Roy contre la proposition gilsonienne : Histoire des idées philosophiques dans la France moderne, b) l’élection du spiritualiste Louis Lavelle contre le philosophe psychologue Maurice Pradines, à la chaire de philosophie. L’article analyse les différents biais (statut de la philosophie à l’université, dans les lycées et collèges, laïcité, statut de la métaphysique, situation politique), affectant l’affrontement entre philosophie et histoire de la philosophie, lieu commun rhétorique des débats idéologiques depuis 1874. (shrink)

Le XIVe siècle allemand a vu l'apparition et le développement d'une forme de philosophie autonome, fortement influencée par le péripatétisme grécoarabe, mais s'orientant de façon croissante vers le néoplatonisme le plus authentique: celui de Proclus. Si la transition de l'aristotélisme à la «théologie platonicienne» a connu son point culminant dans le Commentaire des Éléments de théologie de Berthold de Moosburg, elle a été préparée par une série de décisions philosophiques, acquises pour l'essentiel chez Albert le Grand. L'objet du présent article (...) est de montrer comment la théorie albertinienne de la contemplation philosophique, avec ses notions spécifiques de «conjonction» et d'«intellect acquis», a servi de point de départ à la reviviscence de l'idéal antique de sagesse contemplative qui caractérise l'école dite «de Cologne», de Dietrich de Freiberg à Berthold lui-même, en passant par Maitre Eckhart. (shrink)

We review the history of the philosophy of fondue since Aristotle so as to arrive at the formulation of the paradox of Swiss fondue. Either the wine and the cheese cease to exist (Buridan), but then the fondue is not really a mixture of wine and cheese. Or the wine and the cheese continue to exist. If they do, then either they continue to exist in different places (the chemists), but then a fondue can never be perfectly homogenous (it is (...) a French fondue). Or the wine and the cheese continue to exist in the same place (the Stoïcs), but then wine and cheese have to be, oddly, penetrable and spatially expansible. Aristote attempted to solve this paradox by arguing that the cheese and wine continue to exist, but only potentially in the fondue. We sketch an alternative answer. The wine and the cheese continue to exist, but only non-spatially in the fondue. Wine and cheese, once mixed, become non-spatial constituents of the fondue, a bit like character traits are non-spatial constituents of persons. The wine and the cheese are in the fondue, but only the fondue is there in the fondue pot. (shrink)

This article offers a tentative deconstruction of Heidegger’s account of the “modern,” that is, the “Cartesian,” “subject.” It argues that subjectivity, understood as the idea of some “thing” that is both the owner of certain mental states and the agent of certain activities, is a medieval theological construct, based on two conflicting models of the mind (nous, mens) inherited from ancient philosophy and theology: the Aristotelian and the Augustinian (or perichoretic) one, developed in connection with such problems as that of (...) the two wills in the incarnate Christ. Starting with Nietzsche’s criticism of the “superstition of logicians” (the belief that“the subject I is the condition of the predicate think”) and Peter Strawson’s question in Individuals (“Why are one’s states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?”), the article discusses Peter Olivi’s and Thomas Aquinas’s treatments of the problem, as well as the principle invoked to resolve it: actiones sunt suppositorum, “actions belong to subjects.” Against this background, the discussion refers to Heidegger’s notion of “subjecticity” and Armstrong’s “attribute-theory” in order to reappraise the Hobbesian and Leibnizian contributions to the history of the Self. (shrink)

An interview with Alain de Benoist -- Confronting globalization -- Nazism and communism : evil twins -- What is sovereignty? -- The first federalist : Johannes Althusius -- On politics -- On the French right-new and old : an interview with Alain de Benoist -- On identity -- On the French referendum -- Our American friend Paul Piccone was a free spirit and a loud talker -- The current crisis of democracy -- Dismantling the left-right divide -- What (...) is populism? (shrink)